In Maxey v. Maxey, in a dispute that arose from the probate of an estate, two sisters mediated and reached a settlement agreement concerning the division of certain real property. No. 01-19-00078-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 10281 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] December 29, 2020, no pet. history). The two sisters disagreed on how they would divide property among certain trusts, and they sued one another. After mediation, they entered into a settlement agreement that purported to divide the real property. Then the parties disagreed on what the settlement agreement meant, and once again sued each other regarding breach of the agreement. The trial court found the settlement agreement was ambiguous and submitted the meaning of the agreement to a jury. After the jury trial, the court entered judgment on the verdict, and the losing sister appealed.

The court of appeals reversed and held that the settlement agreement was not ambiguous:

We disagree with the trial court that the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous. The Settlement Agreement identifies the Marble Falls Property, provides that it is to be divided in such a way that Mary’s trust receives a tract worth one-half of the value of the entire property and Carolyn’s trust receives a tract worth one-half of the value of the entire property, and further provides that Mary’s trust is to receive the “West 50%” and Carolyn’s trust the “East 50%.” As Mary argues, this language is clear and can be given definite meaning: the sisters agreed that the Marble Falls Property was to be divided into two tracts, equivalent in value, and that Mary would receive the western tract and Carolyn the eastern tract. This language is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. To the extent the trial court ruled that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous because it was silent on precisely how the Marble Falls Property was to be divided and did not set out metes and bounds for the two specific tracts, we note that our sister courts have repeatedly held that ambiguity in contract language is not to be confused with silence. An ambiguity results when the intention of the parties is expressed in language that is susceptible to more than one meaning. In contrast, when a contract is silent, the question “is not one of interpreting the language but, rather, one of determining its effect.” Courts may not and will not rewrite contracts to insert provisions that the parties could have included, but did not, and that are not essential to the construction of the language of the contract.

The fact that the Settlement Agreement did not specify, through metes and bounds or some other method, how Carolyn was to divide the Marble Falls Property does not make the language in the Settlement Agreement ambiguous. The agreement provided that the property was to be divided into two tracts of equivalent value, with Mary receiving the western tract and Carolyn receiving the eastern tract. As we have held, this language can be given certain and definite legal meaning, and it is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. We therefore conclude that the Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous.

We conclude that, because the language of the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous, the trial court—and not the jury—should have determined the parties’ intent as a matter of law, “and it could not do so by relying on extrinsic evidence to create an intent that the contract itself does not express.” We therefore hold that the trial court reversibly erred by ruling that the Settlement Agreement was ambiguous, admitting and instructing the jury to consider parol evidence concerning whether the parties intended to divide the Marble Falls Property according to the Brookes Baker Survey, and submitting Question Number One to the jury.

Id. The court therefore remanded the case back to the trial court to construe the settlement agreement and properly divide the real property. The court also reversed and remanded the prevailing party’s request for specific performance.

Interesting Note: Parties in trust and estate cases often have to mediate and settle disputes that involve real property interests. When the parties agree to undivided interests, this is often not a problem. For example, parties often agree to split undivided interests in mineral estates so that they can each have the same chance of having a productive well. However, undivided interests in surface estates rarely settles disputes and only generates future confrontations. So, parties typically want to have divided interests in surface estates. Without having a surveyor on the property as the mediation is being conducted, the parties are often challenged in creating metes and bounds descriptions of tracks of real property. The parties and their attorneys worry about whether the settlement agreement will be enforceable where they do not have definite descriptions of the tracks. This case is very good in that is shows that parties can enter into enforceable and unambiguous settlement agreements that divide real property where they provide as much description as possible (short of metes and bounds) on how to divide the property.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law